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Abstract
Natural resource abundance is a blessing for some countries, but a curse
for others. We show that di¤erences across countries in the degree of …scal
decentralization can contribute to this divergent outcome. Using a large panel of
countries, covering several decades and various …scal decentralization and natural
resource measures, we provide empirical support for the novel hypothesis. We
also study a model that combines political and market mechanisms, under a
uni…ed framework, to illustrate how natural resource booms may create negative
e¤ects in …scally decentralized nations.
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1 Introduction
Since the in‡uential works of Sachs and Warner (1997, 1999, 2001) the so-called re-
source curse puzzle, describing an inverse relationship between resource abundance and
economic growth, has attracted considerable attention. Albeit facing criticism (e.g.,
Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008), further studies have provided additional empirical ev-
idence of this phenomenon as well as various potential explanations for its occurrence.
Among these explanations (see van der Ploeg 2011 for a survey of the literature), au-
thors have emphasized political factors, corruption, underdeveloped legal and …nancial
systems, Dutch Disease mechanisms, or human-capital inhibiting institutions.
This paper contributes to this strand of the literature by further examining the type
of institutions that can contribute to the above result. More speci…cally, we focus on the
level of …scal decentralization, a novel explanation. Fiscal decentralization comprises
the …nancial aspects of devolution to regional and local governments, and it covers
two main interrelated issues. The …rst is the division of spending responsibilities and
revenue sources between levels of government. The second is the amount of discretion
given to regional and local governments to determine their expenditure and revenues.
The de…nition that we adopt concerns both issues, yet emphasizes the latter. Our main
hypothesis is that …scally decentralized economies are more vulnerable to the growth
curse of natural resources than …scally centralized ones.
Consider, for example, the case of Venezuela versus Botswana. Both are heavily
endowed with natural resources, yet the former experienced negative growth rates in
the period of 1970-1990, while the latter presented one of the highest positive growth
rates during that time. According to the Fiscal Decentralization Indicators of the
World Bank, the economy of Venezuela is highly …scally decentralized whereas that
of Botswana is the most centralized in the sample. Let us consider other resource
abundant countries with a share of mineral output in total GDP greater than 10 percent
on average between 1972 and 2008. Some of the most …scally centralized ones include
Azerbaijan, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia and Norway; all of which performed (growth-
wise) remarkably well in the periods investigated in our samples. Conversely, some of
those that are most …scally decentralized include Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iran, Mexico, and
Zambia; all of which performed rather poorly during the same time frames.
We o¤er a theory that combines political and market mechanisms, under a uni…ed
analytical framework, to illustrate possible income-reducing e¤ects that operate when
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natural resource booms hit …scally decentralized nations. The political aspect builds
on the notion that local governments, especially if poorer and in distant regions, can be
less e¢cient at providing public goods and fall more easily prey of corruption (e.g., see
Rodriquez-Pose and Ezcurra 2011).1 If this is the case, resource windfalls will incen-
tivize rent-seeking behavior of local, …scally-autonomous, governments. In addition,
the model also considers a market mechanism: a natural resource boom gives resource
rich regions an advantage in the inter-regional …scal competition over factors (borne
by …scal decentralization) which they exploit to attract capital from the rest of the
economy.2 This leads to a capital movement towards areas that are less productive
because, as we show later, they bene…t less from agglomeration externalities (e.g., see
Ciccone and Hall 1996) and public infrastructure.3 These two channels contribute to
the potential drop in the nation’s total output level.
The paper provides empirical evidence for the main hypothesis and key predictions
of the model. We adopt the World Bank’s Fiscal Decentralization Indicators to add a
…scal decentralization measure together with its interaction with resource share mea-
sures to the regressions. The analysis is performed under a cross-country framework
which enables studying the full extent of the variation in …scal decentralization. For the
natural endowment, we employ a variety of aggregate measures such as primary rents,
natural capital stock, as well as price-based measures, and also look at the individual
e¤ects of cropland, forest, pastureland, protected areas and sub-soil assets.
We start with Sachs and Warner’s (1997) data and methodology. The time pe-
riod is 1970-1990 over a sample of 51 countries. Results con…rm the main hypothesis
and show that the growth curse of natural resource ampli…es in …scally decentralized
economies, and is mainly driven by sub-soil assets. These results hold when controlling
for investment, openness, institutional quality, ethnicity, terms of trade, education, and
interaction terms of ethnicity and institutional quality with the resource share proxy.
Departing from Sachs and Warner, we thereafter employ an extended sample of
73 countries over the period of 1972-2008 to test the same hypothesis through panel
1This does not mean that …scal decentralization increases corruption nation-wide. Papers such as
Fisman and Gatti (2002) actually …nd the opposite. What it implies is that corruption rises in …scally
autonomous regions where resource booms occur. We later reference papers that support this role.
2Raveh (2013) studies a similar market mechanism, termed the Alberta E¤ect. He, however, focuses
on within-region e¤ects, and does not consider agglomeration economies or public goods as inputs.
3 Introduced by Marshall (1920), the concept of agglomeration economies refers to the positive
externalities of economic integration at the local level, especially with respect to increased labor
market pooling, shared inputs, and knowledge spillovers.
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estimations, having largely the same controls as in the cross-sectional version, but in
addition controlling for country and time …xed e¤ects. The main result remains. By
undertaking further checks, we conclude that the con…rmation of our hypothesis is
robust to using various …scal decentralization and resource share measures, as well as
to di¤erent estimation methods and time periods.
Several papers within the natural resource curse literature have investigated the in-
stitutional link. Lane and Tornell (1996) suggest that the existence of powerful groups
in conjunction with weak institutions provide an explanation for the curse. Mehlum et
al. (2006) provide additional evidence that the quality of institutions matter. Other au-
thors like Caselli and Michaels (2013) and Brollo et al. (2012) o¤er empirical evidence
indicating that the quality of institutions deteriorate as a response to oil windfalls; in
particular, they show that local corruption levels increase. In addition, some papers
looked into the type of institutions that matter for the said curse. Andersen and Aslak-
sen (2008) provide empirical evidence that point at the importance of constitutional
arrangements. Hodler (2006) argues that natural resources cause con‡ict in ethnic
fragmented societies that, in turn, weakens property rights. We contribute to this lit-
erature by studying an additional related institutional aspect: …scal decentralization;
to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the …rst to do so.
Our paper also relates to the debate on the e¤ect of …scal decentralization on
economic growth. Since the seminal work of Tiebout (1956), a literature has emerged
stressing the bene…ts of …scal decentralization. For example, Oates (1972) and Qian
and Roland (1998) argue that this can occur through a higher degree of discipline
on local governments and more e¢cient resource allocation. Other authors, however,
argue against those bene…ts. Fiscal decentralization may introduce harming distortions
related to …scal competition that can prompt a race-to-the-bottom in local taxes and
welfare provision – Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) – or produce overinvestment in
infrastructure – Keen and Marchand (1997). As Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003)
conclude in their survey of the literature, the e¤ect still remains an open question. We
contribute to this ongoing debate by emphasizing the potential adverse e¤ects of …scal
decentralization on welfare manifested through natural resource abundance; a channel
that, to our best knowledge, has not been considered previously in this context.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents and analyzes the model.
Section 3 provides the empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Analytical Framework
To help organize the discussion, we now construct a simple framework that illustrates
how …scal decentralization can interact with natural resources to a¤ect income. Specif-
ically, we consider two potential channels that operate under a uni…ed setting; one
related to political factors, and another to the optimal choice of taxation across …scally
decentralized regions.
2.1 Regions and consumers
Assume that there are  small regions in a closed and …scally decentralized econ-
omy, each with its own government, competing for the nation’s capital stock. Regions
possess the same production and preference structure. They can di¤er in the endow-
ment of natural riches, capacity to generate public goods, and population density –
characteristics that are taken as given. Region ’s …xed population is denoted by .
These assumptions deserve some comment. First, foreign capital in‡ows are poten-
tially important for natural resource exploitation. Multinational …rms, for example,
…nance their own activities, and are in charge of the exploitation of oil …elds in many
countries. This is, nevertheless, consistent with our closed-economy model because it
treats income from natural riches as exogenous, as in for instance Caselli and Cunning-
ham (2009).
Second, we abstract from the existence of a central government. As long as resource
abundant regions bene…t more from their natural resources compared to the resource
poor ones, our results would go through. This has the underlying implication that
resource abundant regions have some …scal advantage due to the resources located in
their territories, irrespective of any existing equalization payment schemes.4
Third, as Oates (1993), Prud’homme (1995) and Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2005),
among others, argue, di¤erences in the capacity to generate public goods can be a
4This may happen directly due to the control of the tax base, or indirectly through revenue sharing
and grants from the central government. In the former case, decentralization directly provides the re-
gions some …scal ownership over its resources; examples include Argentina, Canada, the United Arab
Emirates and the United States, where subnational ownership over resources is constitutionally en-
trenched. Under revenue sharing and grants arrangements, on the other hand, the central government
owns the natural riches, yet it may redistribute greater proportions of the revenues to natural-resource
rich areas; examples now include Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria and Russia
(see Brosio and Jimenez 2012 for Latin America, and Ahmad and Mottu 2002 for nations worldwide).
In addition, notice that even in the most equalized federations some signi…cant …scal imbalance re-
mains regardless of the equalization schemes (see Boadway 2006 for the case of Canada).
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consequence of economies of scale in production, administration or even negotiation,
so that a central government or bigger/richer regions might be more e¢cient at the
provision of public goods. Inman and Rubinfeld (2000), and Storper (2005) also em-
phasize that local governments may fall more easily prey of elites or special-interest
groups, and su¤er from greater corruption.
Finally, the …xed-population assumption is made for simplicity. What is essentially
required for the model results to hold is that labor is su¢ciently less mobile than capital;
speci…cally, when moving towards less agglomerated areas where natural resources are
located. We further discuss and present supporting evidence for these latter claims
regarding the lack of factor co-movement and systematic di¤erences in agglomeration
levels in Appendices A and B.5
Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor and one unit of capital that are
inelastically supplied to the production sector. As return from the use of these inputs,
the consumer obtains a wage payment () and an interest rate () that are allocated
to the consumption of a private good () and to pay taxes levied on capital at rate  .
A representative individual derives utility () from the consumption of this private
good and from a public good  supplied by the government:
 = ln() + ln() (1)
where
 =  +  ¡   (2)
2.2 Governments
Regional governments are rent-seekers and …scally autonomous. Region ’s authorities
tax capital () and use the region’s natural input endowment () to obtain rents
() and …nance the public good. The emphasis on capital taxation is made because
of its relative importance in …scally decentralized scenarios (see Newman and Sullivan
1988, and Wilson and Wildasin 2004), and is more speci…cally motivated by our focus
on capital mobility.
The problem reduces to choosing  ,  and  to maximize their current utility
() that depends on the rents and the representative consumer’s utility. For ease of
5Implicit in this is the assumption that capital is relatively highly mobile across regions within the
same nation. Previous studies support this notion. In particular, Kalemi-Ozcan et al. (2010) show
the strong …t of neoclassical models when considering a within-U.S. framework.
5
exposition, policymakers take as given all variables that are not directly under their
control. More speci…cally, the government in region  solves:
max
f g
f =  ln + (1¡ )g   2 [0 1] (3)
subject to
 +   =  + (4)
 given by (1),
     taken as given.
The weighting coe¢cient  can be interpreted as a region-speci…c rent-seeking
parameter; we also use it to capture possible heterogeneity in the capacity of regions
to provide the public good . A higher value of  implies that the government is
more interested in its own consumption, either because of corruption or because of an
inability to provide better public services. Expression (4) is a feasibility constraint that
equates public revenues to public expenditures.
The …rst order conditions to this problem imply the following optimal choices:
  =
1
2¡ 
·
 +  ¡ (1¡ )


¸
 (5)
and
 = (1¡ ) ( +  )  (6)
The tax rate then falls with the natural endowment, and increases with income and
. Government spending , on the other hand, rises with tax revenues and natural
resources, and falls with the intensity of the rent-seeking behavior of politicians .
Another interesting implication of expression (5) is that for a su¢ciently large value of
the natural endowment, the region can fully …nance public goods using natural riches,
and then the optimal tax rate becomes a subsidy to private-goods consumption.
2.3 Production and equilibrium outcomes
Expressions (5) and (6) determine the control variables as implicit functions, because
 depends on equilibrium prices and taxes. In order to know how tax rates and
government spending reacts to changes in exogenous variables and parameters, we
need to specify the production side of the model. We assume that there exist a large
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number of pro…t-maximizing …rms of mass one that produce in region ’s non-resource-
extractive sector using labor and capital as inputs according to
 = 

 
1¡
 ; (7)
where  2 (0 1); and  is the region-speci…c technology level which we discuss later.
Unlike labor, capital moves perfectly across regions until the rental price net of
taxes () is equalized and the capital market clears. Market clearing requires that
X
=1
 =  ; (8)
where  is the nation’s capital stock, taken as given.
To see how the region’s capital stock reacts to changes in exogenous variables and
parameters, we compute the tax rate,  , and the net return to capital, . Assuming
that …rms take prices as given, the …rst order conditions to the …rms’ pro…t maximiza-
tion problem deliver
  =

2¡ 
µ


¶µ
1¡ + 


¶
¡
µ
1¡ 
2¡ 
¶


(9)
and
 =

2¡ 
µ


¶ ·
(1¡ )


¡ (1¡ )
¸
+
µ
1¡ 
2¡ 
¶


 (10)
The last two equalities imply that, other things constant, both   and  rise with
. The impact of , on the other hand, is positive on   but negative on . In
addition, the RHS of expression (10) declines with . Hence, because net returns are
equalized across areas, a region with a higher  or a lower  will attract less capital –
the former e¤ect is due to the larger tax rate charged, and the latter one to the smaller
input productivity.
To see how the provision of public goods is a¤ected, combine (6), (7), and the fact
that inputs are paid their marginal productivity to get:
 =
1¡ 
2¡ 
½

µ


¶
[(1¡ ) + ] + 
¾
 (11)
Government spending then falls with the intensity of politicians’ rent-seeking, and
increases with the productivity parameter – notice that this remains true even when
taking into account equilibrium e¤ects on capital.
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2.4 Fiscal decentralization and the natural resource curse
A natural resource curse occurs if a resource windfall in one of the regions induces an
economy-wide decrease in the output produced by the non-resource sector that more
than o¤sets the gains that the newly discovered natural riches bring to the nation. In
our model, this means that


X
=1
( + )  0 (12)
Looking at expression (7) that gives non-resource sector output , the curse in our
model can be seen as a consequence of a su¢ciently large decrease in the weighted
average of  across regions.
Let us consider that
 = 

 

 ; (13)
where ,  are strictly positive. The e¤ect of the output level  on the region-speci…c
productivity captures agglomeration externalities of the type emphasized by Ciccone
and Hall (1996). The e¤ect of , in turn, re‡ects the contribution of public goods
as inputs, either directly as infrastructure, or indirectly through their role, for exam-
ple, in the human capital accumulation process. Both of these e¤ects in expression
(13) are potentially important for our analysis: natural resources are located in rela-
tively low agglomerated areas (see Appendix A for evidence), and the impact of …scal
decentralization on growth is related to the capacity of regions to provide public goods.
Coming back to the question of when inequality (12) may hold, a region that enjoys
a resource windfall will in principle tend to have a larger  – by (11) – and therefore
a larger . However, there are at least two channels in the model that can contribute
to diminish  and deliver the negative sign in (12): one related to politics, and the
other to the reallocation of capital among regions.
The political channel is related to forces that directly generate a lower provision of
public goods. This could be the case if
 = () (14)
and   0; put di¤erently, if a resource windfall intensi…es the rent-seeking
behavior of politicians. By expression (11), a higher rent-seeking parameter implies
a lower , leading to lower productivity () and output levels. If the reduction is
su¢cient, it will produce a natural resource curse.
8
This e¤ect can be present, to some extent, regardless of the degree of …scal de-
centralization. However, as discussed earlier a higher degree of …scal independence
contributes to making the curse more pronounced if local governments, speci…cally in
poorer and less agglomerated regions, fall more easily prey of elites, special-interest
groups, and corruption. Indeed, supporting empirical evidence are obtained by Brollo
et al. (2012) and Caselli and Michaels (2013) who …nd that in Brazil, a …scally decen-
tralized nation, municipalities that enjoy resource windfalls become more corrupted,
and do not increase the supply of public goods.
The second channel is a market mechanism. Expression (13) implies that multifac-
tor productivity is a function of the regional level of economic activity and the supply
of public goods. Therefore, the reallocation of capital towards geographical areas with
weaker agglomeration externalities and, as a consequence, less government spending
will contribute to generate the curse. This originates directly from …scal decentraliza-
tion. In particular, it is a consequence of the lower tax rate chosen by regions that
enjoy the resource windfall, as seen through condition (9).6 Another factor that can
contribute to the negative e¤ect is the input misallocation generated by the constant
population assumption, which increases the disparity in capital-labor ratios across re-
gions. In Appendix B, we carry out a calibration exercise that shows that the market
mechanism is quantitatively able to cause the curse.
3 Empirical Evidence
This section provides empirical support for the main hypothesis of the paper; namely,
that …scally decentralized economies are more vulnerable to the growth curse of natural
resources. It also tests the ampli…cation mechanisms to which the theory has pointed
out. Given that the fundamental …ndings on the curse are rooted in the seminal work of
Sachs and Warner (1997), subsection 3.1 tests our hypothesis using their database and
cross-sectional methodology. Later, subsection 3.2 departs from Sachs and Warner and
undertakes panel estimations using an extended sample of countries and years covered.
6There is evidence that supports that better-endowed areas compete more aggressively and drain
capital from their poorly endowed counterparts. For example, Cai and Treisman (2005) provides
evidence for post-communist Russia, Raveh (2013) for U.S. states, and Yao and Zhang (2008) for
a less developed nation like China. For general discussions on the importance, and occurence, of
competition for production factors in …scally decentralized nations see, for example, Qian and Roland
(1998) and Li et al. (2000).
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Finally, in subsection 3.3, we undertake various robustness checks.
A detailed description of all variables, their de…nitions, and sources, are given in
Appendix C. Appendix D provides the nations included in each of the samples. Table
1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables employed in the paper.
3.1 Cross-section tests
We …rst employ Sachs and Warner’s (1997) data, variables, and cross-sectional esti-
mation methodology. Because of limitations in the …scal decentralization data, the
original sample reduces to a cross-section of 51 countries that covers the period of
1970-1990. Employing those numbers, we test the following model:
^ = 0 + 1 + ; (15)
where  represents the country; ^ is average annual growth in real per capita GDP
during the interval 1970-1990;  is a vector of controls that includes resource share,
initial income, openness, investment, institutional quality, ethnicity, terms of trade,
education, …scal decentralization, interactions terms of the natural resource share with
ethnicity, institutional quality, and …scal decentralization, and a dummy for landlocked
economies;  is the disturbance. Our focus will be on the latter interaction term, which
puts our hypothesis to test.
In their analysis, Sachs and Warner (1997) measured resource abundance as the
GDP share of mineral output in 1970. One key concern in the resource curse literature
is the potential endogeneity of this measure (van der Ploeg 2011). Therefore, in the
benchmark cross-sectional framework, we follow Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and
Arezki and van der Ploeg (2011), and use the World Bank’s (2006) measure of natural
capital: the total stock of sub-soil assets, timber, non-timber forest resources, protected
areas, cropland, and pastureland. This stock variable is arguably more exogenous to
growth than Sachs and Warner’s ‡ow variables, because it captures an economy’s
amount of proven natural reserves rather than its capacity to produce or export them.
Hence, in the analysis to follow to we use the GDP share of natural capital in 2000 as
the resource share proxy.7
7Year 2000 is preferred because it gives the largest sample size, 51 countries. Results do not change
qualitatively in case the numbers provided by the World Bank for 1995 and 2005 are employed instead.
Results do not change either if we use Sachs and Warner’s measure – the mineral output GDP share
in 1970; estimates using this last proxy are provided in Table A1.
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As for the …scal decentralization measure, we follow Davoodi and Zou (1998), Oates
(1985, 1993) and Zhang and Zou (1998), and employ the World Bank’s Fiscal Decen-
tralization Indicators, which are based on data from the International Monetary Fund’s
Government Finance Statistics.8 Since the World Bank provides several of those mea-
sures, we use the one that most closely resembles the model’s notion of …scal decentral-
ization, which is the degree to which sub-national governments fund their expenditures
through their own revenue sources (Vertical Imbalance). The higher the indicator, the
more independent sub-national governments are, implying that the country as a whole
is more …scally decentralized.9
Results appear in Table 2. Regression 1 replicates Brunnschweiler and Bulte’s
(2008) analysis with the addition of Mehlum et al.’s (2006) interaction term of institu-
tional quality and resources, Hodler’s (2004) interaction term of fractionalization and
resources, and our proposed interaction term of …scal decentralization and the resource
share proxy (along with the …scal decentralization variable). Results on the various
controls replicate those presented in previous studies in terms of signs and occasion-
ally signi…cance, including those on the non-…scal-decentralization interaction terms,
which replicate Hodler’s (2004) and Mehlum et al.’s (2006). Regression 1 con…rms our
main hypothesis: the estimated coe¢cient on the interaction of …scal decentralization
and resources is negative and signi…cant, con…rming our main hypothesis by showing
that the negative growth e¤ect of resources is transmitted through the decentralization
channel.10
Given that the natural capital measure is an aggregation of various types of nat-
ural resources, we disaggregate it to its various components (namely, cropland, forest,
pastureland, protected areas, subsoil assets) to better understand the source of this.
Results appear in Regressions 2 to 6 in Table 2, where we use the GDP share of each
8In terms of coverage, indicators are only provided for countries that report expenditures at both
the national and sub-national levels. Nonetheless, as reported by the World Bank, this coverage
re‡ects a lack of reported data rather than few countries with local and provincial governments; also,
this should not necessarily re‡ect di¤erences in the degree of …scal decentralization between countries
included in the sample and those that are not – the sample ranges from highly decentralized countries
to highly centralized ones.
9Given that Sachs and Warner’s (1997) analysis starts at 1970, the …scal decentralization measure
collected for each country is the one closest to 1970, up to 1975 (to mitigate endogeneity concerns), so
that countries that do not have such a measure available up to 1975 are not included in the sample.
This limits the coverage of our cross-sectional sample to 51 countries.
10For all cases reported in Tables we have also estimated the regressions without incorporating
any of the …scal decentralization related variables, and with …scal decentralization but without its
interaction term. Results were similar for all variables.
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component. In these cases interactions of the resource proxy with ethnicity and in-
stitutional quality are excluded to minimize multicollinearity. The main result holds
only under the subsoil assets, being the triggering group for the overall average e¤ect.
Indeed, this is consistent with the focus minerals have taken in previous studies on the
natural resource curse (e.g. Sachs and Warner 1997, Ross 2001).
To further strengthen our claim let us try to o¤er additional evidence in favor of the
mechanisms that drive the model prediction that …scally decentralized nations may not
bene…t from resource windfalls: inter-regional di¤erences in agglomeration levels. In
particular, smaller isolated areas can be less e¢cient in the production and provision
of public goods, and subject to stronger corruption problems. This is the main source
in the model of the negative e¤ects induced by a resource windfall.
More speci…cally, we construct an agglomeration index based only on population
density vis-a-vis urbanization levels. This measure divides each country’s total non-
urbanized area by its total area (both in square kilometers); where the calculation of
non-urbanized areas follows the de…nition of non-urbanization provided by the United
Nations, on per-country basis.11 A higher value is interpreted as an indication of greater
agglomeration di¤erences. Importantly, the sample shows virtually zero correlation
between this agglomeration measure and economic growth, which mitigates endogeneity
related concerns.
The model prediction is that decentralized economies with a higher index are more
vulnerable to the growth curse. We multiply the …scal decentralization measure and
the above index, and refer to the updated index as potential vulnerability. Results
appear in Regression 9, and con…rm those presented in Regression 1. This provides
some validation to the underlying forces, implying that resource endowments may be
hurting …scally decentralized economies through the proposed channels.
Fiscal decentralization can also su¤er from endogeneity problems. Previous studies
show that …scal decentralization has several determinants, the key ones being land area,
level of democracy, and level of income, each a¤ecting …scal decentralization positively
– see Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), Oates (1972), Panizza (1999), and Treisman
(2006). Thus …scal decentralization may in fact be endogenous to growth through an
unobserved development factor; consequently, the positive association between income
and …scal decentralization could be creating an upward bias. We address this concern
11For detailed de…nitions see the Gridded Population of the World database of the Center for
International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University.
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by taking an IV approach. In particular, we use the abovementioned determinant, land
area, as instrument for …scal decentralization. Consistent with the …ndings of previous
studies, the logarithm of land area is positively correlated with our measure of …scal
decentralization ( = 051), as depicted in Figure 1. As for the exclusion restriction,
some authors such as Alesina et al. (2005) discuss the potential endogenous nature of
a country’s land area and its in‡uence on economic growth. Their work suggests that
controlling for the degree of openness can minimize this in‡uence; this is what we do.
Our identi…cation assumption is that, once controlling for the level of openness, land
area a¤ects growth solely through the …scal decentralization channel.12
We follow Wooldridge’s (2002) approach to instrumentation of endogenous interac-
tion terms. In the …rst stage, we predict …scal decentralization using the instrument
and the exogenous explanatory variables of the regression. We then interact the pre-
dicted variable with the natural resource share proxy and use it in the second stage
of the TSLS estimation. Results appear in Regressions 7 and 10. First stage results
con…rm the validity of the instrument, through the  -statistic and the coe¢cient of
interest (being positive and signi…cant). Second stage estimations, in turn, show that
the key result remains: the coe¢cient on the interaction term of decentralization and
resources is negative and signi…cant in all cases.
3.2 Panel data analyses
The previous cross-sectional analyses, a-la Sachs and Warner, raise several concerns.
First, the time period covered is limited (1970-1990). Second, the sample covers merely
51 countries. Last, the cross-sectional estimation methodology potentially gives rise to
both omitted variable and endogeneity biases (van der Ploeg 2011). Departing from
Sachs and Warner, we now employ an extended panel that covers the period 1972-2008
(in 9-year intervals) for 73 countries; the maximum number provided by the World
Bank’s Fiscal Decentralization Indicators.13 The use of this panel allows addressing
the above concerns.
12Regardless of any arguments over exogeneity, there were very little changes in the land area of the
countries in our sample throughout the investigated period. In fact, the only countries in our sample
that experienced such a change are Denmark, Philippines, and Spain, with the largest change being
at a rate of only 0.07 percent over the period.
13This is an unbalanced panel, limited by data availability of the World Bank’s Fiscal Decentraliza-
tion Indicators. We use 9-year intervals to maximize sample size, while maintaining a relatively long
time interval, consistent with the resource curse hypothesis; longer time intervals decrease sample size
signi…cantly.
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We estimate the following model:
^ = 0 + 1 +  +  (16)
The variables ^,  and  are the same ones as in speci…cation (15), for country
 at date , with the di¤erence of excluding ethnicity and terms of trade as controls
due to lack of data, as well as some additional measurement di¤erences outlined below.
Because the Hausman test strongly rejects (at the 1% level) the null hypothesis of an
e¢cient random e¤ects model, we take a …xed e¤ects approach and include , denoting
country …xed e¤ects. This approach also mitigates potential omitted variable bias,
alleviates concerns regarding potential multicollinearity by centering variables, and
helps controlling for unobserved within-country constant phenomena, being a standard
concern under the given framework. All variables are measured in the initial year of
the corresponding time interval to reduce endogeneity concerns,14 and are expressed in
deviations from period means so that time …xed e¤ects are also implicitly controlled
for in all the corresponding regressions (e.g., see Caselli et al. 1996).
Not all the explanatory variables employed in these panel estimations are measured
in the same way as in the cross-sectional analysis due to data limitations, though
all our measures are standard in the economic growth literature (see Appendix B).
Speci…cally, given its greater coverage, institutional quality is now measured by the
Civil Liberties Index, which is commonly used as a proxy for institutional quality. Civil
liberties, however, do not capture corruption levels that are essential for our analysis.
Therefore, as a separate control, we follow Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) and consider
the level of democracy as proxy for corruption, using data from the Polity-IV project
dataset.15 We include as well its interaction with the resource proxy to control for the
heterogeneous e¤ects across levels of corruption (but excluding the interaction with
institutional quality, due to multicollinearity).
As for resource abundance, we also use a di¤erent measure, in an attempt to capture
exogenous variations in resource shocks over time. This measure is constructed as
follows: for each country, we take the GDP share of mineral rents in the earliest year
available, and multiply it by the average international price index of mineral goods
14Nonetheless, we note that results are not sensitive to the alternative usage of average values.
15Note that the correlation between our proxies for corruption and institutional quality stands at
approximately 0.5, a¢rming to some extent their distinct de…nitions, and motivating their concurrent
inclusion in the regressions. Nonetheless, we note that all results hold if only one of them is included.
In addition, we discuss multicollinearity related concerns separately in a later section.
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(normalized to 2005) at time .16 Put di¤erently, we keep the initial share of mineral
production in GDP constant, but we weigh the share at each point in time with the
corresponding level of mineral prices.
As presented in Figure 2, the relative international ranking in the GDP share of min-
eral output (having nations with no mineral output assigned a rank of 1) has changed
little over time: countries that were largely mineral abundant at the beginning of the
period (1972) appear to hold their relative ranking 36 years later ( = 081). Keeping
the share of mineral production in GDP constant, hence, can still capture accurately
the countries’ relative position with respect to their mineral abundance over time. To
the extent that changes in international mineral prices are exogenously driven and that
initial mineral output is pre-determined, we argue that the variation we investigate is
indeed exogenous since it is entirely triggered by changes in the international price of
minerals.
Results appear in Regression 1 of Table 3. Results on convergence, openness, invest-
ment, institutional quality, democracy, education, decentralization and the interaction
of resources with institutional quality are similar in sign, and occasionally in signif-
icance, to previous …ndings in the cross-section tests. Interestingly, the regression
shows that our main result – a negative and signi…cant coe¢cient on the interaction
term between …scal decentralization and resource share – holds in this case as well.
There is a debate in the literature on the nature of the link between …scal de-
centralization and internal con‡icts (Siegle and O’Mahony 2006). To the extent that
…scal decentralization may induce internal con‡icts, the observed e¤ect on growth may
be driven through that channel. We test this hypothesis by adding an indicator for
whether an internal armed con‡ict has taken place in the investigated time interval;
this measure is retrieved from the Uppsala Con‡ict Data Program.17 This exercise is
undertaken in Regression 2 which shows that our main result on the interaction term
of interest remains.
16Data retrieved from the World Bank. Mineral resources include: oil, natural gas, minerals, and
coal. Rents are computed as unit rents times production, where a unit rent is the unit price less unit
cost. The price measure is a general index that does not account for the di¤erent mineral shares of
each country; prices of di¤erent minerals, however, exhibit strong co-movement.
17An internal armed con‡ict is de…ned as a contested incompatibility that concerns government
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. The internal armed con‡ict occurs
between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s), without intervention
from other states.
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3.3 Additional robustness checks
Regressions 3 to 5 in Table 3 contain further robustness tests of our main hypothesis.
Using the panel data, we begin by considering an output-based resource measure, which
allows us to examine variations in resource discoveries and technology improvements
(on top of price variations, as was done initially): the GDP share of primary rents.
Regression 4 reproduces Regression 1 using this output-based measure. Results on all
variables, including our interaction term, are similar in sign and signi…cance.
Nevertheless, as was mentioned previously, this measure is potentially endogenous
(motivating our use of the price-based measure in the baseline speci…cation); thus,
we take an IV approach and instrument it with the GDP share of mineral rents in
¡ 1. We view this measure as a suitable IV, because it is highly correlated with our
proxy ( = 09), and relatively exogenous to growth. Its exogeneity can be justi…ed as
follows: …rst, mineral rents are not dependent on an economy’s capability to export,
thus making it less correlated with development and growth; second, mineral rents in
developing economies are usually extracted by multi-national …rms that bring their
own technology and production factors, making these rents relatively independent of
unobserved development indicators; last, the lagged value is arguably more exogenous
to growth in the following period. Estimation of the endogenous interaction term is
carried out using the previously described procedure. Results are reported in Regres-
sion 5 of Table 3. First stage results validate the instrument, and the second stage
ones con…rm our main result.
Let us now test the hypothesis using a di¤erent …scal decentralization measure, and
in particular, the Kearney Decentralization Index (Arzaghi and Henderson 2005). Al-
though there are several available decentralization indices, we adopt this one because
of its larger time and country coverage: the index is available for 43 developing and
developed countries over the years 1965-1995. The Kearney measure is a comprehen-
sive index that covers nine distinct dimensions of …scal decentralization. We adopt one
of them: the Revenue Raising Authority dimension; it measures sub-national govern-
ments’ formal authority to raise their own revenue through taxation, which resembles
the model’s notion of decentralization more closely.18 Regression 3 of Table 3 repli-
cates Regression 1 using the Kearney measure, the previously described price-based
18This component of the index assigns each country a number between zero and four, with four
having the highest level of revenue raising autonomy and zero the least.
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resource measure, and a panel that covers the period of 1965-2000 with 5-year in-
tervals.19 Results under these measure are similar to previous estimations; our main
result, therefore, is robust to di¤erent decentralization variables.
We realize that throughout the panel analyses the …scal decentralization measure
remains potentially endogenous. Adopting a suitable IV with su¢cient time variation is
not straight forward. As an alternative, we turn to test the cross-sectional version of our
panel employing the logarithm of land area as an instrument for …scal decentralization.
More speci…cally, we extend the previously used Sachs and Warner’s cross-sectional
sample to 2008, use the logarithm of land area as IV for …scal decentralization, and
employ the previously discussed natural capital measure as the resource share proxy.
Regression 8 of Table 2 gives the outcome of this exercise for the period 1970-2008.
Our main …nding is once again con…rmed. Although not presented, similar results arise
when the time interval from 1990 to 2008 is used instead.
To this point we considered maximized cross-country samples that include both
developed and developing economies. Often times, however, the natural resource curse
hypothesis refers speci…cally to developing economies (Auty 1993). Let us test, there-
fore, whether our result holds for developing economies. Hence, we divide our samples
into high and non-high income economies based on the earliest available classi…cation
provided by the World Bank starting at 1989, and estimate the basic speci…cations as
in Regression 1 of Table 2 and Regressions 1 and 3 of Table 3, for each group sepa-
rately.20 Due to multicollinearity concerns when the sample is split, we exclude the
interaction terms of the resource share measure with fractionalization and rule of law
in the cross-sectional case, and the measure of democracy together with its interaction
with the price-based resource measure in the panel cases. Results appear in Table 4. As
can be seen, the main result is strongly apparent in the developing economies group,
and weakly so in the developed one. This result also lends support to the political
angle of the model, and its potential signi…cance in the overall mechanism, given that
corruption levels are higher and markets more imperfect in developing economies.
Given our empirical setting, using various standard country-level controls and inter-
19We adopt 5-year intervals in this case, again, to maximize the sample size (notice that the index
is available in 5-year intervals as well). Nonetheless, results do not change qualitatively if 10-year
intervals are adopted instead.
20See Appendix D for a list of economies included in each group. We note that results hold as well
if the developed-economies group includes also the middle-income countries, leaving the developing-
economies group with the low-income ones only.
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action terms, one concern is that our main results may be plagued by multicollinearity.
In the panel analyses this is addressed through the usage of a …xed e¤ects framework
that centers the variables. However, to address this further we estimate the benchmark
regressions, namely Regression 1 of Table 2, and Regressions 1, 3 and 4 of Table 3, with
the non-…scal-decentralization related interactions excluded. Results appear in Table
A2. The highest Variance In‡ation Factor (uncentered) in all cases is 6.58, indicating
multicollinearity levels are su¢ciently low. In all Regressions the main result remains
to hold in sign, signi…cance, and magnitude, hence alleviating related concerns.
4 Conclusion
The question of why resource endowments lead to divergent outcomes continues to
attract much interest among economists. This paper presented a novel answer to that
question: countries with a high degree of …scal decentralization are more vulnerable to
the negative e¤ects of natural resource windfalls. The new hypothesis also contributes
to understanding the e¤ects of …scal decentralization on economic growth.
We explored a model that suggests possible channels through which …scal decen-
tralization and natural resource booms can interact to increase the probability of a
natural resource curse. To support the theory, we have shown that natural resources
are located in less agglomerated, sparsely-populated regions; areas in which we have
argued that agglomeration externalities are weaker, and the growth-harming e¤ects
emphasized by the …scal decentralization literature are more likely to arise. If this
is the case, resource windfalls may incentivize rent-seeking behavior of local, …scally-
autonomous, governments – the political channel. In addition, natural riches can lead
less agglomerated and e¢cient regions to cut taxes and attract capital from more pro-
ductive areas – the market mechanism. These two channels can contribute to drop
total output in the nation, following a natural resource boom.
The main hypothesis – that countries with a high degree of …scal decentralization
are more vulnerable to the natural resource curse – has been empirically tested and
con…rmed. First, we used the original Sachs and Warner’s (1997) data set and method;
then, an extended panel, in conjunction with the World Bank’s Fiscal Decentralization
Indicators. Finally, we have shown that results are robust to di¤erent resource abun-
dance and …scal decentralization measures, as well as to di¤erent estimation techniques
and time periods.
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The paper has, in general, remained agnostic about the contribution of each of the
two mechanisms to our estimations – whether one is more important than the other.
Yet results have shown that the interaction between …scal decentralization and natural
resources is driven mainly by developing nations. This suggests that political channels
might be more signi…cant than market mechanisms. Nevertheless, assessing more accu-
rately the relative importance of each of them represents a promising avenue for future
research. In addition, results may be sensitive to the speci…c periods and countries
investigated. Future work should further test the results and analyze the suggested
mechanisms using di¤erent data sets and case studies, as they become available.
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Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Growth, 1970-1990 1.3 1.6 -3.09 5.7 Ethnicity 36.89 28.35 0 89
Growth, 1970-2008 3.4 3.1 -1.2 17.77 Terms of trade -0.41 2.32 -4.69 7.38
GDP share of mineral 
output 
0.04 0.08 0 0.37 Education 0.17 0.14 0.005 0.54
GDP share of natural 
capital 
0.02 0.05 0.0001 0.38 Landlocked economies 0.13 0.34 0 1
Logarithm of initial 
income 
8.65 0.86 6.76 9.95 Vertical Imbalance 67.15 23.94 7.02 99.8
Openness 0.5 0.45 0 1 Potential Vulnerability 62.47 24.75 3.96 99
GDP share of 
cropland
0.02 0.02 0.0001 0.104 GDP share of pastureland 0.006 0.008 0.0002 0.04
GDP share of forest 0.006 0.01 1E-05 0.06
GDP share of protected 
areas
0.006 0.01 3E-05 0.09
Investment 2.86 0.49 1.33 3.61
Modified Potential 
Vulnerability 
9.63 4.31 0.97 20.6
Institutional quality 3.56 2.005 1 6 Logarithm of land area 12.65 1.97 6.54 16
GDP share of subsoil 
assets
0.005 0.01 0 0.05
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Growth, 1972-2008 2.13 2.75 -8.06 12.98 Growth, 1965-2000 2.14 2.98 -11.39 22.4
Price-based resource 
measure 
1.81 8.48 0 120.4
Price-based resource 
measure 
4.42 7.61 0 61.7
GDP share of primary 
rents 
0.05 0.09 0 0.78 Logarithm of initial income 7.49 1.57 4.43 10.5
GDP share of mineral 
rents 
0.03 0.08 0 0.78 Openness 0.39 0.24 0.05 1.92
Logarithm of initial 
income 
8.75 1.25 4.91 11.4 Investment 24.75 8.81 1.34 58.3
Openness 0.71 0.42 0.02 3.24 Institutional quality 4.31 2.19 1 7
Investment 24.4 9.23 5.17 70.31 Education 5.45 2.95 0.13 12.7
Institutional quality 4.86 1.83 1 7
Kearney Decentralization 
Index 
1.18 1.06 0 3.56
Education 7.17 2.82 0.57 12.7 Democracy 4.66 4.19 0 10
Democracy 5.93 4.11 0 10
Vertical Imbalance 45.72 21.25 0.91 97.38
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Further descriptions and sources of all variables are outlined in the Appendix.
A. Cross-sectional analysis
B. Panel analysis
Regressions 1, 2, 4, and 5; Table 3 Regression 3; Table 3
Panel A: Main and second stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (TSLS)
(TSLS, 
extending 
to 2008)
(OLS) (TSLS)
Natural capital 10.72 17.27 6.23 7 .67 14.34
(27.01) (27.47) (54.59) (27.29) (27.56)
Cropland  -6.68
(22.01)
Forest -30.37
 (46.53)
Pastureland -150.36
(132.22)
Protected areas -1.5
(52.78)
Subsoil assets 37.54
(30.89)
Logarithm of initial income -2.02*** -2.15*** -2.04*** -1.89*** -2.02*** -1.54*** -1.94*** -2.22*** -1.99*** -1.94***
(0.38) (0.41) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.36) (0.34) (0.45) (0.37) (0.34)
Openness 2.81*** 2.12*** 2.32*** 2.22*** 2.27*** 1.99*** 2.75*** 5.09*** 2.81*** 2.75***
(0.49) (0.49) (0.41) (0.53) (0.48) (0.51) (0.49) (1.45) (0.49) (0.49)
Investment 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.21 0.24 1.05* -0.26 1.16 -0.05 -0.22
(0.45) (0.48) (0.49) (0.56) (0.55) (0.53) (0.39) (0.85) (0.42) (0.39)
Rule of law 0.04 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.13 0.05 -0.43 0.05 0.05
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.18) (0.19) (0.44) (0.2) (0.19)
Ethnicity -0.01 -0.009 -0.007 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.01) (0.01) (0.006) (0.007) (0.03) (0.007) (0.007)
Terms of trade 0.16** 0.13* 0.13 0.13 0.18** 0.31*** 0.16** 0.05 0.16** 0.16**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07)
Education 2.85** 2.06* 2.22* 2.54* 2.68** 1.99* 2.68** 4.43* 2.72** 2.69**
(1.29) (1.19) (1.25) (1.36) (1.28) (1.13) (1.28) (2.49) (1.23) (1.28)
Landlocked economies 0.22 -0.63 -0.29 -0.99** -0.99* -1.11** 0.41 0.19 0.28 0.39
(0.45) (0.59) (0.38) (0.49) (0.54) (0.43) (0.51) (0.91) (0.45) (0.49)
Ethnicity x Resource share -0.62** -0.71** -1.06 -0.61** -0.66**
(0.27) (0.26) (0.68) (0.27) (0.29)
Rule of law x Resource share 7.84** 8.14** 18.32** 7.97** 7.89**
(3.67) (3.77) (7.2) (3.74) (3.81)
Fiscal decentralization 0.008 0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Fiscal decentralization x Resource 
type share
-0.39*** -0.34 -0.31 1.77 -0.25 -1.19*** -0.46*** -0.71** -0.37*** -0.43***
(0.08) (0.33) (0.53) (1.37) (0.6) (0.38) (0.1) (0.27) (0.09) (0.09)
Adjusted R-squared 0.7853 0.7238 0.7513 0.6956 0.708 0.7532 0.7733 0.6517 0.7827 0.7695
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Regressions:
Dependent variable:
Logarithm of land area
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
Standard errors are robust and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *,**, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. First stage regressions include all relevant variables. All regressions include an intercept.  ‘Resource type’ refers to the specific type of natural 
resource examined in the regression. All resource-type variables are measured as GDP shares (source: World Bank 2006). For description and sources of 
variables, as well as a list of economies included in each regression, see Appendix.
Fiscal decentralization
3.59***
(0.99)
0.7823
17.2
Fiscal 
decentralization
4.93***
Table 2: Cross-country growth regressions, cross-section [Sachs and Warner (1997) database, period: 1970-1990, unless specified otherwise]
(0.91)
0.8146
21.16
Panel B: First stage results
Dependent variable: Average annual 
growthin real per capita GDP, 1970-1990
Fiscal decentralization 
is 'Potential 
Vulnerability'
(7), (8) (10)
Fiscal decentralization is 'Vertical Imbalance'
Panel A: Main and second stage 
results
(1) (2)
(3)
Kearney
(4)
(5)
[TSLS]
Resource share  0.47 0.46 0.003  10.41 6.78
(0.44) (0.43) (0.05) (8.3) (10.44)
Logarithm of initial income -3.46*** -3.48*** -2.2* -4.18*** -4.36***
(1.23) (1.23) (1.2) (1.24) (1.28)
Openness 1.26 1.22 1.1 1.14 1.19
(1.26) (1.34) (1.94) (1.13) (1.22)
Investment 0.38 0.39 2.32*** 0.71 0.81
1.2 (1.19) (0.62) (1.09) (1.16)
Civil liberties -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.22 -0.63*** -0.56***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Democracy -0.12 -0.12 -0.03 0.01 0.21
(0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Democracy x Resource share -0.09 -0.09 -0.004 1.64 -0.59
(0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (1.24) (0.89)
Education 0.39 0.34 0.85*** 0.34 0.24
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23)
Fiscal decentralization -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.002 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.29) (0.01) (0.01)
Fiscal decentralization x 
Resource share
-0.01*** -0.01** -0.05** -0.4** -0.4**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.02) (0.19) (0.19)
Internal armed conflicts -0.11
(0.62)
Adjusted R-squared 0.8034  0.8035 0.5859 0.7982 0.7987
Observations 207 207 232 207 207
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of economies included 73 73 43 73 73
Panel B: First stage results
Regressions:
Dependent variable:
GDP share of mineral rents in t-1
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
Standard errors are robust, clustered by country, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, 
*** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance, respectively. In Regressions 1, 2, 4, and 5 the period covered is 1972-
2008 in 9-year intervals, with the fiscal decentralization measure being ‘Vertical Imbalance’; In Regression 3 the period 
covered is 1965-2000, in 5-year intervals, with the fiscal decentralization measure being the Revenue Raising Authority 
component of the Kearney Decentralization Index. First stage regressions include all relevant variables. All regressions include 
an intercept. All variables are expressed as deviations from period means so that time fixed effects are controlled for in all 
regressions. For description and sources of variables, as well as a list of economies included in each regression, see Appendix.
Table 3: Cross-country growth regressions, panel data (OLS estimations, unless specified otherwise]
71.04
(5)
GDP share of primary rents
0.99***
(0.06)
0.8877
Using the price-based measure as the
resource share proxy
Using GDP share of primary rents 
as the
resource share proxyDependent variable: Average 
annual growthin real per capita GDP 
for sample period
Cross section 
(Table 2, 
Regression 1)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 1)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 3)
Cross section 
(Table 2, 
Regression 1)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 1)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource share 11.82** 0.54 -0.03 -9.77 0.26 0.21**
(4.24) (0.74) (0.05) (107.337) (0.32) (0.08)
Logarithm of initial income -2.48***  -2.95*** -1.94 -1.05* -4.11*** -4.68***
(0.33) (1.39) (1.22) (0.57) (1.16) (1.31)
Openness 3.43*** 0.001 1.21 2.21 3.88*** 3.14
(0.71) (1.33) (2.64) (1.72) (1.22) (1.87)
Investment -0.02 1.16 2.23*** 0.63 -1.72 -0.59
(0.67) (1.56) (0.62) (0.69) (1.29) (1.37)
Rule of law 0.25 -0.28
(0.25) (0.28)
Ethnicity -0.03*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Terms of trade 0.16** 0.91
(0.07) (0.35)
Landlocked economies -0.49 -0.46
(0.89) (0.35)
Education -0.19 0.79* 1.14*** 2.51* -0.21 0.31
(2.66) (0.42) (0.29) (1.23) (0.24) (0.52)
Civil liberties -0.69** -0.14 -0.23 -0.43**
(0.29) (0.21) (0.19) (0.14)
Fiscal decentralization 0.02 -0.02* 0.01 0.02* -0.01 -0.31
(0.01) (0.01) (0.37) (0.01) (0.02) (0.27)
Fiscal decentralization x 
Resource share
-0.48*** -0.01** -0.04** 0.01 -0.02* -0.04
(0.13) (0.005) (0.02) (1.31) (0.01) (0.04)
Adjusted R-squared 0.8272 0.7128 0.6417 0.8421  0.3802  0.358
Observations 30 120 161 21 94 74
Number of economies included 30 48 29 21 27 14
Table 4: Revisitng main results using restricted samples of developing and developed economies [OLS estimations]
Standard errors are robust, clustered by country in Regressions 2, 3, 5, 6, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, 
**, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance, respectively.  Regressions 1, 2, 3 (4, 5, 6) replicate Regression 1 of Table 2 and 
Regressions 1 and 3 of Table 3, respectively, using a restricted sample of developing (developed) economies; unlike the benchmark 
specifications, the interaction terms of the resource share measure with fractionalization and rule of law in the cross-sectional cases, and the 
measure of democracy together with its interaction with the price-based resource measure in the panel cases, are excluded, to avoid 
multicollinearity; this increases the sample in the panel cases, compared to that in the benchmark specifications. For description and sources 
of variables, as well as a list of economies included in each regression, see Appendix.
Developed economiesDeveloping economies
Dependent variable: Average annual 
growth in real per capita GDP
Figure presents the correlation between the logarithm of land area (source: World Bank Indicators) 
and the cross-sectional fiscal decentralization measure (‘Vertical Imbalance’; source: World Bank 
Fiscal Decentralization Indicators).
Figure 1: Fiscal decentralization and land area
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Figure presents the Spearman Correlation between the GDP share of mineral output in 1972 and 
that in 2008 (source: World Bank Indicators); ρ=0.81.
Figure 2: Relative rank of resource dependence: 1972 VS. 2008
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
2008
1972
A Natural resources and Agglomeration
A main foundation of the theory is that natural resources locate in less agglomerated
regions. In this Appendix, we o¤er evidence that con…rms it.
Let us focus, for example, on the agglomeration index computed by Ciccone and
Hall (1996) for the 48 contiguous U.S. states in 1988. It measures the intensity of labor,
human and physical capital relative to physical space, and is expressed as a number
between one and two. The estimated agglomeration index is lowest for Montana, a
resource rich state, and highest in the District of Columbia, a resource poor area. Figure
A1 shows that there is a clear negative correlation between the resource endowment
and agglomeration ( = ¡072) within that group.
Figure A2 presents similar state-level graphs using population density to capture
agglomeration for Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Malaysia, Russia, and
United Arab Emirates.21 Even though population density is a narrower concept than
agglomeration, the two variables are highly positively correlated. In the Figure, we
can see that all these nations show similar negative relationships between population
density and resource abundance, implying that at regional levels resources indeed locate
in non-agglomerated areas.
B The Quantitative Version of the Model
As mentioned, there is empirical evidence that supports that   0, that is, the
political channel. Only partial evidence are available, however, for the market one. We
tackle this issue in this Appendix, albeit indirectly, carrying out a calibration exercise
that shows that the market mechanism is quantitatively able to cause the curse. We
also discuss the role of the lack of labor mobility in the result, and provide evidence
that supports our approach.
In order to focus exclusively on the market mechanism, we abstract from the rent-
seeking behavior of politicians and from the role of public goods as inputs; that is, we
take  =  = 0. In addition, we slightly modify production function (7) to make it
closer to the one proposed by Ciccone and Hall (1996). In particular, expression (7)
becomes:
 = 
¡
 
1¡

¢
; (17)
where  2 (0 1) proxies the income share of non-land inputs in non-extractive indus-
tries.
To make the quantitative analysis more relevant, we also relax some of the exogene-
ity assumptions made for ease of exposition in the government’s problem. In particular,
we let politicians internalize the agglomeration externality and the e¤ect of the tax rate
21Data retrieved from the central statistical agencies of each federation. We plot correlations for
the earliest year for which data is available at the state level. Australia: 1990; Brazil: 1995; Germany:
1991; Canada: 1984; Malaysia: 2005; Russia: 2004; India: 1980; United Arab Emirates: 2000.
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on the …rm’s demand for capital. Finally, we weigh the impact of public goods on 
by a factor , which allows calibrating the size of the public sector to the data.
B.1 Solutions
Policymakers take as given the net return to capital , which is equalized across regions.
From technology (17), they also know that demand for capital and labor provided by
the …rst order conditions of the …rms’ problem are given by
 = (1¡ )


 (18)
and
 =  +   = 


 (19)
respectively. Incorporating the modi…cations proposed, and employing expressions
(1),(4),(7), (13) and (19), the government’s problem (3) can be rewritten as
max
 
½
 = ln  +  ln


¾
   0 (20)
subject to
 =   + ; (21)
 = 
1(1¡¡)
·
1¡
µ

 +  
¶¸ 1¡¡
 (22)
 +  =  + (23)
The …rst order condition to the above problem obtains


=
1

µ
1 +
1
1¡  ¡ 
¶
= ; (24)
where  = . Substituting conditions (21) and (23) into (24), we can write the
optimal capital tax rate as
  =
¡  

(1 + )¡ 1
 (25)
When   (), the tax rate becomes negative, thus implying a subsidy.
In order to know how the tax rate reacts to changes in the variables and parameters
that the region takes as exogenous, we can use expressions (19), (22) and (25) to get
(+  )
1¡
f ¡ [(1 + )¡ 1]  g
1¡¡
=

h
() (1¡)
i
()
1¡¡
 (26)
This equality implicitly solves   as a function of  and region-speci…c characteristics.
When 1 ¡  ¡   0, the optimal value of   is unique and decreases with the
endowment , becoming zero for a su¢ciently large value of .
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Governments choose taxes according to (25), and the return to capital moves until
the capital market clears – that is, condition (8) holds. At that point, the whole
economy is in equilibrium, and the following non-arbitrage condition holds:
 = 


¡   = 


¡   (27)
B.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated to a representative average nation.22 Let us start with the
production function parameters. The productivity parameter  is normalized to 1.
Gollin (2002) reports that labor shares are relatively similar across nations with an
average of about 07; we then pick  = 07. There are few estimates of the share of land
in non-extractive industries’ value added. Probably the most compelling number is the
one provided by Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2008), who estimate a land income share
of Agriculture around 10 percent using 1997 U.S. input-output tables and purchaser
prices. Hence,  = 090, and then  = 079. Estimates of the agglomeration externality
parameter are also scarce. To choose now a number, we follow Ciccone (2002) that …nds
an elasticity of labor productivity with respect to employment density of 45 percent
in a sample of European nations – similar to the 4 percent estimated for the U.S. by
Ciccone and Hall (1996). As a consequence, (1¡ ) equals 1045, and  = 0139.
We allow the natural endowment to vary from  to 15 percent of the natural-
richest economy’s income level; this means that  varies from  to 05 in our
simulations. In turn, the value of the aggregate capital stock  is picked so as to
generate, on average, a capital-output ratio of about 3 for economies that have a 
above the median; this approach agrees with country level data on capital stocks and
natural resource rents provided by PWT 8.0 and World Bank, respectively. A value of
3 is also supported by evidence presented in Inklaar and Timmer (2013) using PWT
8.0 data; in particular, these authors …nd that the capital-output ratio is uncorrelated
with GDP per capita levels across nations, with an average close to 3.
Agglomeration di¤erences between resource abundant and resource scarce regions
are proxied by population density …gures. Density di¤erences between resource-rich and
resource-poor regions vary greatly across nations. For example, if we compare popu-
lation density between the 10 most natural-scarce and the 10 most natural-abundant
regions, the ratio of the former to the latter is 480 in Brazil, 452 in India and 178 in
Russia. We choose an intermediate value of 25, and assign  = 1 and  = 25.
22When numbers for developed and developing economies were available, we did not …nd signi…cant
di¤erences across countries in the values, except for within-country density di¤erences. Resource-
scarce and resource abundant economies showed also an additional di¤erence with respect to the
capital-output ratio, with the resource-rich having a slightly larger capital-output ratio on average.
Nevertheless, our quantitative results were not sensitive to reasonable changes in either the capital-
output ratio or density. Therefore, our …ndings apply to both developing and developed economies,
as well as resource scarce and resource abundant nations.
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Finally, the parameter , that is, the weight of public goods in consumer’s utility
function is calibrated to reproduce the share of the government spending in GDP, used
as a proxy for the ratio (+) in the model. Looking at the cross-country average
from 2005 to 2009 provided by PWT 8.0, this number is about 18 percent, and its
correlation with the income share of natural-resource rents is very low (¡006). The
18 percent implies that  equals 055.
B.3 Simulation results
We now present the results obtained in the simulations. Suppose that our model econ-
omy, composed of identical regions, starts without natural riches, and that, suddenly,
there is a natural resource windfall in region . Given that all other regions are identi-
cal, we can treat them as a unique economy, call it region . We look at the equilibrium
values of some key variables depending on the size of the shock.
Figure A3 presents results for four di¤erent parameterizations. The …rst row gives
the benchmark calibration described in the previous section. The second row is ob-
tained when the agglomeration externality parameter  rises. In this case, the value of
 is also modi…ed to maintain the share of the public good invariant, and then abstract
from demand-side e¤ects. In the third row, the capital share  falls, and is equivalent
to making di¤erences in the capital-labor ratio less important for the results. Finally,
row 4 shows the e¤ect of a decrease in the share of the public good in total income
( +).
The two columns in Figure A3 provide results for tax rates and income levels
(vertical axes) as a function of the natural endowment variable  (horizontal axis).
Recall that, by assumption, region  does not own natural riches ( = 0). More
speci…cally, the LHS column gives results for the tax rates   (taui, black line) and
  (tauj, grey line). The RHS column, in turn, shows the predicted values of income
in region  (, solid grey line), income plus natural resource endowment in region 
( + , black line) and income in the whole country ( +  =  +  + , dashed
black line).
The qualitative e¤ects on tax rates and regional income are the same across rows.
In particular, when  =  = 0, tax rates in both regions coincide.
23 As the natural
endowment rises in , this region reduces pressure on taxpayers. Region  then responds
in the opposite direction, rising its capital tax rate to be able to …nance public goods,
thus amplifying the capital out‡ow. Income in region  falls due to this, but increases
in region  because of both the capital in‡ow and the natural resource discovery.
Quantitative …ndings and the e¤ect on the nation’s total income are, however,
di¤erent across scenarios. Look at the dashed line in the RHS panels. In the benchmark
economy (…rst row), the country’s income falls as  increases. The movement of capital
23Bucovetsky (1991) shows that in an asymmetric tax competition with population d¤erences, the
more populated region imposes higher tax rates. This exercise extends his analysis by showing that
an agglomeration externality can possibly correct for that, as we observe that in equilibrium tax rates
are equal despite having population di¤erences.
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from the resource poor region to the resource abundant one causes output loss, because
the same unit of capital can produce more in the agglomerated region than in the non-
agglomerated one.
The importance of the agglomeration externality can be shown by picking a larger
value of . In particular, we increase  from 0139 to 025. As row two shows, this
change makes the decrease in income larger as  rises. The reason is that the impact
of a larger  on   goes up, in absolute terms, with the agglomeration externality
parameter (see expression (5)). Put di¤erently, competition to attract capital becomes
…ercer. The LHS chart also shows that the governments tax the extra output from the
agglomeration externality at a higher rate. The reason now is the higher multifactor
productivity related to the stronger externality.24
Rows three and four in Figure A3 represent two cases in which income levels in the
country do not fall with natural riches. The …rst one (third row) is when the labor
share is su¢ciently low. This case illustrates the importance for the results of the
lack-of-labor-mobility assumption. When the share of labor falls from 07 to 06 – thus
 increases from 022 to 033 – the e¤ect of a change in  on economy-wide output
becomes slightly positive. We …nd the same e¤ect in row four, which gives results
when the share of public goods in total income falls from 18 to 10 percent. A smaller
government needs less taxes to …nance itself and reacts less to changes in the natural
endowment. In both cases, the ultimate reason for the lack of a negative impact on
total income is that the tax rates in both regions do not react as much to changes in
the natural endowment, .
B.4 Does labor follow capital everywhere?
As we have shown, the assumption that labor is immobile matters to obtain the natural
resource curse result through the market mechanism. If labor were fully mobile, the
agglomeration externality would cause all labor and capital to move to region  as soon
as new natural riches are discovered, increasing the nation’s welfare level. However,
if population density is …xed, the externality is de facto not able to induce increasing
returns. As a consequence, only a fraction of capital is reallocated, and then the
externality serves to generate a stronger negative e¤ect on tax rates and total income.
Nevertheless, what we need is not the complete lack of labor mobility. It can be
easily deduced that it is su¢cient for our results to go through (in addition to having
the standard framework of diminishing marginal productivities) that capital and labor
do not move together towards low-agglomerated resource abundant regions. In other
words, the requirement is that resource rich and resource poor areas o¤er su¢ciently
di¤erent incentives to capital and labor. In what follows, we argue that the latter is a
sensible assumption.
To start with, recall that the mere existence of di¤erent population densities in
24This is consistent with previous studies on tax competition and agglomeration. See Borck and
P‡uger 2006.
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a nation is inconsistent with agglomeration externalities in case labor was to follow
job opportunities only. Besides the evidence on agglomeration externalities presented
by Ciccone and Hall (1996), other authors also point out in the same direction. For
example, Decressin and Fatas (1995) …nd that regional labor adjustments in Europe
occur through a fall in the participation rate instead of through outwards migration.
Focusing more on resource poor versus resource rich regions, anecdotal evidence on
unemployment also suggests the same conclusion. If labor moved following only job
opportunities, unemployment rates should be equalized across economies. However,
oil rich areas such as Aberdeen in the U.K., and North Dakota and North Slope Bor-
ough (Alaska) in the U.S. enjoy much lower unemployment rates than their respective
national economies. According to the O¢ce of National Statistics, the unemployment
rate in Aberdeen on July 2010 was 2.2%, compared to 8.4% for Scotland. The above
two U.S. areas display similar patters: unemployment rates on February/March 2012
in North Dakota and North Slope Borough were 3.1% and 5.5%, respectively; much
lower than the 8.3% of the U.S..
Let us now look more directly at the relationship between changes in each of the
two inputs and natural resources. More speci…cally, we look at the partial correlation
between the growth in population density and the initial GDP share of the primary
sector, and between the growth in investment and the initial GDP share of the primary
sector, controlling for the initial values of the non-natural input measures (to account
for potential convergence e¤ects).
Following the above agglomeration example, we …rst examine the case of the U.S.
in Figure A4. The upper panel depicts the residuals from regressing the average annual
growth from 1977 to 2008 of population density on population density in 1977 against
the residuals of the GDP share of the primary sector in 1977 on population density in
1977. Notice that the slope of the regression line gives the coe¢cient on the natural
input measure in the regression of population density growth on natural resources and
initial population density. This slope is negative and statiscally signi…cant, giving
some indication that population in resource abundant regions grows more slowly.25 In
Figure A5 we present results of a similar exercise for additional nations, yielding similar
results.26
The bottom chart in Figure A4 undertakes the same, within U.S., analysis for the
capital input. For the same time period, the panel depicts the residuals from regressing
the growth of the GDP share of investment on the initial GDP share of investment
against the residuals of the initial GDP share of the primary sector on the initial GDP
25This result is supported by Michaels et al. (2012) who …nd that since the late 19th century densely
U.S. regions became more densely populated over time, compared to those regions with relatively low
initial density levels.
26Results appear for Australia, Brazil, Germany, and India. Data retrieved from the central sta-
tistical agencies of each federation. We plot correlations for the maximized period for which data is
available at the regional level. Australia: 1990-2009; Brazil: 1995-2008; Germany: 1991-2009; India:
1980-2008.
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share of investment.27 Now results are opposite: resource abundant regions attract on
average more capital. That is, investment increases faster but population grows more
slowly in regions with more resources. This is obtained while controlling for possible
transitional e¤ects caused by relatively low initial levels, and also for investment in-
duced by output changes. In Figure A6 we present results of a similar exercise for
additional nations, yielding similar results.28
This evidence provides support to the assumption that labor does not follow capital
at least towards less agglomerated and more isolated areas where natural riches are
mostly located. We could say that whereas capital only searches for …nancial returns,
labor shows a preference for more agglomerated areas.
C List of Variables
C.1 Cross-sectional estimations
Source of variables in these tables is Sachs and Warner (1997), unless stated otherwise.
Growth (dependent variable). Measure 1 (used in all regressions, with the
exception of Regression 8 of Table 2): Average annual growth in real per capita GDP
in the years 1970-1990. Measure 2 (used in Regression 8 of Table 2): Average annual
growth in real per capita GDP in the years 1970-2008 (source: World Development
Indicators).
Logarithm of initial income. The log of real per capita GDP in 1970.
Resource share. Measure 1 (used in all cross-sectional regressions, with the
exception of those in Table A1): Share of natural capital in total GDP in 2000; natural
capital is calculated as the sum of cropland, forest, pastureland, protected areas, and
subsoil assets (source: World Bank 2006). Measure 2 (used in Table A1): Share of
mineral production in total GDP in 1970.
Cropland. Share of cropland in total GDP in 2000; cropland wealth is calculated
as the net present value of the return to land, being the rents from cultivating crops
(source: World Bank 2006).
Forest. Share of forest in total GDP in 2000; forest wealth is the sum of timber
and non-timber forest wealth. The former is calculated as the present discounted value
of rents from roundwoood and fuelwood production, whereas the latter is obtained as
the present value of the returns from annual non-timber goods and bene…ts derived
from services provided by forests (source: World Bank 2006).
27For the investment measure, we follow Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) and proxy it employing the
GDP share of industrial machinery production, because BEA does not publish investment data at the
state level.
28Results appear for Australia, Brazil, Germany, and India. Data retrieved from the central sta-
tistical agencies of each federation. We plot correlations for the maximized period for which data is
available at the regional level. Australia: 1990-2008; Brazil: 1995-2005; Germany: 1991-2005; India:
1980-2005.
36
Pastureland. Share of pastureland in total GDP in 2000; pastureland wealth is
calculated as the net present value of the return to land, being the rents from selling
livestock products (source: World Bank 2006).
Protected areas. Share of protected areas in total GDP in 2000; protected areas
are estimated as the opportunity cost of preservation i.e. the minimum of wealth
derived from alternative uses of land such as growing crops and livestock (source:
World Bank 2006).
Subsoil assets. Share of subsoil assets in total GDP in 2000; subsoil assets are
calculated as the present value of rents from extraction of oil, natural gas, coal, and
minerals (source: World Bank 2006).
Openness. The fraction of years over the period 1970-1990 in which the country
is rated as economically ’open’, according to Sachs and Warner (1997).
Investment. The log of the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP,
averaged over the period 1970-1989.
Institutional quality. The Rule of Law Index from the International Country
Risk Guide, in 1982, expressed as a number between one and six, six presenting best
institutional quality and one least.
Ethnicity. Measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization; measures the probability
that two randomly-selected people from a country will not belong to the same ethnic
or linguistic group.
Terms of trade. The average annual growth rate in the log of the external terms
of trade between 1970 and 1990. External terms of trade are de…ned as the ratio of an
export price index to an import price index.
Education. Secondary school enrollment rate in 1970.
Landlocked economies. A dummy variable for landlocked economies.
Fiscal decentralization. Vertical Imbalance: The extent to which sub-national
governments rely on their own revenue sources for their expenditures; it is measured
in initial year, closest to 1970 in case data is available for one of the years in the 1970-
1975 period; the indicator is a number between 0 and 100 – the closer it is to 100 the
more …scally independent sub-national governments are (source: World Bank Fiscal
Decentralization Indicators).
Potential Vulnerability. The share of non-agglomerated (urbanized) area in
total area in 2001 (source: Gridded Population of the World database, Center for
International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University) multiplied
by the Vertical Imbalance measure.
Land area. The logarithm of land area in square Kilometers (source: World Bank
Development Indicators).
C.2 Panel estimations
Note that Regressions 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Table 3 employ a panel that covers the period
of 1972-2008 with 9-year intervals, whereas Regression 3 of Table 3 employs a panel
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that covers the period of 1965-2000, with 5-year intervals. Unless stated otherwise,
variables are measured in the initial year of the corresponding time interval.
Growth (dependent variable). Measure 1 (used in Regressions 1, 2, 4, and 5
of Table 3): Average annual growth in real per capita GDP in the years 1972-2008,
in 9-year intervals (source: World Bank Development Indicators). Measure 2 (used in
Regression 3 of Table 3): Average annual growth in real per capita GDP in the years
1965-2000, in 5-year intervals (source: World Bank Development Indicators).
Logarithm of initial Income. The log of real GDP per capita (source: World
Bank Development Indicators).
Resource share. Measure 1: Price-based measure; GDP share of mineral rents
(from oil, natural gas, minerals, and coal) in earliest year available multiplied by the
price index of mineral goods, normalized to 2005 (source: World Bank Development
Indicators). Rents are computed as unit rents times production, where a unit rent is
the unit price less unit cost. The price measure is a general index that does not account
for the di¤erent mineral shares of each country; prices of di¤erent minerals, however,
exhibit strong co-movements. Measure 2: GDP share of primary rents (source: World
Bank Development Indicators). Measure 3 (instrument, Regression 5 of Table 3): GDP
share of mineral rents in t-1 (source: World Bank Development Indicators).
Openness. Share of total trade (exports and imports) in total GDP (source: Penn
World Table 7.0).
Investment. The log of the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP
(source: Penn World Table 7.0).
Institutional quality. Civil Liberties Index, expressed as a number between one
and seven, one representing best institutional quality and seven least (source: Freedom
House).
Democracy. Democracy level, expressed as a number between zero and ten, ten
representing the highest level and zero least (source: Polity-IV Project Dataset, Center
for Systematic Peace).
Education. Average years of total schooling for population aged 15 and over
(source: Barro and Lee 2010).
Fiscal decentralization. Vertical Imbalance (used in Regressions 1, 2, 4, and 5
of Table 3): The extent to which sub-national governments rely on their own revenue
sources for their expenditures (source: World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators).
Kearney Decentralization Index (used in Regression 3 of Table 3): The Revenue-Raising
component of the Kearney Decentralization Index, (available for the years 1965-1995)
expressed as a number between zero and four with four having the highest level of
revenue-raising autonomy and zero the least (source: Arzaghi and Henderson 2005).
Internal armed con‡icts. An indicator for whether an internal armed con‡ict
has taken place in the investigated time interval. An internal armed con‡ict is de…ned
as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use
of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state,
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. More speci…cally, an internal armed con‡ict
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occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s)
without intervention from other states (source: Uppsala Con‡ict Data Program).
D List of Countries
D.1 Cross-sectional estimations
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece,
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Korea Re-
public, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia. [Table A1 includes also Sudan].
D.2 Panel estimations
D.2.1 Regressions 1, 2, 4, and 5; Table 3
Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Korea Republic,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mon-
golia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation,
Senegal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Zambia, Zim-
babwe.
D.2.2 Regression 3; Table 3
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea Republic, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique,
Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federa-
tion, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, United States, Uganda, Venezuela, Zaire.
D.3 Developing/Developed Division
Division is made to high and non-high income countries, based on the earliest available
classi…cation of the World Bank (starting at 1989).
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D.3.1 Cross-sectional estimations
Developing economies: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Korea Republic,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sene-
gal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zambia, Zimbabwe. Developed economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States.
D.3.2 Panel Estimations
Developing economies: Albania, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji,
Gambia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Sene-
gal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia,
Zimbabwe. Developed economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
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Panel A: Main and second stage results Initial results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (TSLS) (OLS) (TSLS)
Resource share -15.68* -15.88 2.68 17.54 1.87 11.12
(8.86) (9.75) (14.47) (17.13) (14.81) (16.47)
Logarithm of initial income -1.63*** -1.63*** -1.72*** -1.69*** -1.69*** -1.71***
(0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.35) (0.38) (0.36)
Openness 2.2*** 2.18*** 2.26*** 2.28*** 2.27*** 2.24***
(0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Investment 0.59 0.62 0.84 0.16 0.72 0.24
(0.37) (0.55) (0.51) (0.41) (0.49) (0.41)
Rule of law 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.22
(0.37) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
Ethnicity -0.01** -0.01** -0.01* -0.01** -0.01* -0.01**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Terms of trade 0.21* 0.22* 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.14
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Education 2.06* 2.08* 2.27* 2.18* 2.14* 2.17*
(1.2) (1.2) (1.16) (1.14) (1.18) (1.16)
Landlocked economies -0.49 -0.5 -0.48 -0.28 -0.43 -0.32
(0.44) (0.46) (0.36) (0.36) (0.38) (0.38)
Ethnicity x Resource share 0.02 0.02 0.006 -0.009 0.009 0.006
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Rule of law x Resource share 3.34 3.39 1.49 -0.64 1.33 -0.03
(2.43) (2.66) (2.91) (3.01) (2.94) (3.03)
Fiscal decentralization 0.0008 0.01 0.01 0.009 0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Fiscal decentralization x Resource 
share
-0.14** -0.25*** -0.13** -0.2**
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08)
Adjusted R-squared 0.7155 0.7156 0.739 0.746 0.7366 0.7405
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52
Regressions: (4) (6)
Dependent variable:
Fiscal 
decentralization
Fiscal 
decentralization
Logarithm of land area 4.52*** 5.43***
(1.31) (1.16)
Adjusted R-squared 0.693 0.7364
F-statistic 12.46 16.73
Table A1: Cross-country growth regressions, using the GDP share of mineral output as the resource share proxy [Cross-
section, Sachs and Warner (1997) database, period: 1970-1990]
Standard errors are robust and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 
10, 5 and 1% level of significance, respectively. First stage regressions include all relevant variables. All regressions include 
an intercept. For description and sources of variables, as well as a list of economies included in each regression, see 
Appendix.
Fiscal decentralization is 'Vertical 
Imbalance'
Fiscal 
decentralization is 
'Potential 
Vulnerability'
Dependent variable: Average annual 
growth in real per capita GDP, 1970-1990
Panel B: First stage results
Cross section 
(Table 2, 
Regression 1)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 1)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 4)
Panel (Table 3, 
Regression 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resource share 7.05** 0.45 8.63 0.01
(3.01) (0.43) (9.79) (0.05)
Logarithm of initial income -2.08*** -3.75*** -4.16*** -2.25*
(0.37) (1.24) (1.27) (1.19)
Openness 2.28*** 1.34 1.11 1.19
(0.53) (1.28) (1.19) (1.91)
Investment 0.53 0.59 0.7 2.33***
(0.52) (1.19) (1.1) (0.62)
Rule of law 0.19
(0.18)
Ethnicity -0.02***
(0.01)
Terms of trade 0.16**
(0.07)
Landlocked economies -0.64
(0.5)
Education 3.55**
(1.44)
Civil liberties -0.52*** -0.58*** -0.21
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Democracy -0.001 0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Fiscal decentralization 0.01 -0.02 -0.002 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.29)
Fiscal decentralization x 
Resource share
-0.29*** -0.02*** -0.38** -0.05***
(0.11) (0.01) (0.19) (0.02)
Adjusted R-squared 0.7327 0.6596 0.6591 0.5874
Observations 51 207 207 232
Dependent variable: Average 
annual growth in real per capita 
GDP
Standard errors are robust, clustered by country in Regressions 2, 3, 4, and appear in parentheses for 
independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance, 
respectively.  Regressions 1, 2, 3, and 4 replicate Regressions 1 of Table 2, and Regressions 1, 4 and 3 of 
Table 3, respectively, with the exclusion of non-fiscal-decentralization related interactions; the highest 
Variance Inflation Factor (uncentered) in all cases is 6.58. For description and sources of variables, as 
well as a list of economies included in each regression, see Appendix.
Table A2: Revisitng main results under reduced multicollinearity [OLS estimations]
Figure presents the correlation between the Ciccone-Hall Agglomeration Index (1996) and the GDP 
share of the primary sector in 1988, for the 48 contiguous U.S. states (source: U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis); ρ=-0.72.
Figure A1: GDP share of primary sector Vs. agglomeration in U.S. States
  
 
 
Figure A2: Population density versus resource abundance
Figure presents correlation between state-level population-density and the GDP share of primary sector (each point representing a state 
within the respective federation). Data retrieved from the central statistical agencies of each federation. 
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Figure A3: Tax rates (left) and relative output levels (right) predicted by model
Figure presents results of the quantitative exercise. See Appendix B for further details.
Figure presents the conditional correlation between average annual input growth and initial 
natural resources for U.S. states, 1977-2008, controlling for initial level of input growth (source: 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis), where initial refers to 1977. The input represented in the top 
(lower) panel is population density (GDP share of investment), which proxies for labor (capital). 
Figure A4: Partial correlations of average annual input growth and initial natural resources: U.S. 
states
Figure A5: Partial correlations of state-level average annual population-density growth 
and initial natural resources: Additional countries
Figure presents the conditional correlation between state-level average annual 
population-density growth and initial natural resources, controlling for initial level of 
input growth, where initial refers to initial year. Data retrieved from the central statistical 
agencies of each federation. We plot correlations for the maximized period for which 
data is available at the regional level.
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Figure A6: Partial correlations of state-level average annual investment growth and initial 
natural resources: Additional countries
Figure presents the conditional correlation between state-level average annual 
investment growth and initial natural resources, controlling for initial level of input 
growth, where initial refers to initial year. Data retrieved from the central statistical 
agencies of each federation. We plot correlations for the maximized period for which 
data is available at the regional level.
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